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I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary Of The Dispute. 
In 2007 Bums Holdings, LLC (jointly with its affiliate Burns Concrete, Inc., "Bums") 
entered into an agreement with Teton County, Idaho ("Teton County") providing for Bums' 
construction of (i) substantial road and other public improvements and (ii) a building for a 
concrete batch plant having the elevations depicted in an exhibit to the parties' agreement, which 
specified a 75' height for the building. But shortly after Teton County executed and recorded the 
agreement and Burns then constructed the public improvements and other work it was 
contractually obligated to Teton County to immediately construct-and incurred several hundred 
thousand dollars in out-of-pocket costs doing so-Teton County decided it didn't want Bums to 
construct a 75' building after all and refused to provide Burns with the conditional use permit 
that was then required by the relevant zoning ordinance for a 75' building. 
Because the agreement between Burns and Teton County required Burns to install and 
then operate a temporary concrete batch plant until the 75' building could be constructed, Burns 
installed and continued to operate its temporary plant through the years while it sought to obtain 
the required zoning approvals and building permit. However, after (i) Teton County refused to 
issue Bums a conditional use permit to construct a 75' building, (ii) the Idaho Supreme Court 
ruled that Burns was required to obtain a zoning variance rather than a conditional use permit for 
the building, and (iii) Teton County then also refused to issue Burns a zoning variance to 
construct the building, Burns was left with no alternative but to continue the operation of its 
temporary batch plant until Teton County might once again change positions and amend its 
zoning ordinances to allow for Burns' construction of its desired 7 5' building. 
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Not satisfied with having induced Burns into buying the property for a concrete batch 
plant, installing and operating a temporary and less efficient batch plant pending construction of 
the building depicted in the parties' agreement, and constructing extensive public and other 
improvements to satisfy Burns' contractual obligations to Teton County, Teton County initiated 
action to shut down Burns' operation of its temporary batch plant and rezone Burns' property so 
that it could no longer be used in accordance with the terms of the parties' agreement. Burns 
then filed this lawsuit to enforce the terms of the parties' agreement or, alternatively, recover 
either (i) Burns' actual damages for Teton County's repudiation and breach of the agreement or 
(ii) should the agreement be held to be unenforceable for any reason, restitution damages for the 
benefits Burns provided Teton County under the agreement. 
The elemental issue presented in this appeal is whether Burns' construction of the 75' 
building depicted in the parties' agreement has been delayed or prevented by action beyond 
Burns' control as a result of Teton County's not issuing the zoning approvals and building permit 
required for construction of the building. 
B. Summary Of The Proceedings In The Trial Court. 
Burns filed its verified complaint initiating this civil action on May 21, 2013 [R, p. 1]. 
After Teton County filed its verified answer and counterclaim on June 11, 2013 [R, p. 25], Burns 
filed its initial reply to the counterclaim against it on July 15, 2013 [R, p. 41]. Thereafter, and in 
accordance with the trial court's order granting Burns leave to amend its reply [R, p. 116], Burns 
filed an amended reply to Teton County's counterclaim on December 29, 2014 [R, p. 143]. 
Both Burns and Teton County moved for the entry of summary judgment, with Burns 
moving for the entry of partial summary judgment in its favor on the liability issues only [R, p. 
-2-
21813.00l\4852-1830-6093 v2 
47-48], and Teton County moving for full summary judgment in its favor on both counts of its 
counterclaim [R, p. 65]. The trial court denied Bums' motion and granted Teton County's 
motion through the court's Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary 
Judgment, filed December 19, 2014 ("1st MSJ Decision") [R, pp. 118 & 141]. 
On January 20, 2015, Bums filed a motion requesting reconsideration of the 1st MSJ 
Decision based on the application of the "impossibility doctrine," which was pleaded as an 
additional affirmative defense in Bums' amended reply to Teton County's counterclaim [R, p. 
150]. The trial court denied Bums' motion through the court's Memorandum Decision and 
Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration, filed June 24, 2015 ("2nd MSJ Decision") [R, pp. 168 & 
182]. 
The trial court's final judgment was subsequently filed on July 13, 2015 [R, p. 185]. 
Bums then filed its notice of appeal on August 21, 2015 [R, p. 187], under and pursuant to I.AR. 
1 l(a)(l) with respect to an appeal from a final judgment and within the 42-day period required 
by I.AR. 14(a). 
C. Summary Of The Facts. 
(i) Preliminary Statement. 
1. Bums holds all rights of the defined "Developer" under that certain Developer's 
Agreement for Bums Holdings, LLC, made by and between Bums Holdings, LLC and Teton 




1 ,r 1 [R, pp. 13-24]. (A true and correct copy of the recorded 
Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.) 
2. A true and correct copy of the recorded Agreement is also attached to the 
Complaint as Exhibit I. Complaint ,r 2 [R, p. 2]; Answe/ ,I 2 [R, p. 26]. 
3. Bums sought by its Complaint (a) a decree that Teton County is estopped from 
rezoning the property described in the Agreement and that the time for constructing the 
"Permanent Facility" defined in the Agreement has been tolled since November 15, 2007, when 
the Teton County Board of County Commissioners first voted to deny issuance of the land use 
approvals required for construction of the Permanent Facility; (b) a decree establishing Teton 
County's anticipatory repudiation and material breach and Bums' rescission of the Agreement, 
together with judgment against Teton County for all damages incurred by Bums related to or 
arising out of the Agreement; and ( c) in the event the Agreement should for any reason be held to 
be void or voidable by Teton County, judgment against Teton County for restitution damages in 
an amount equal to the benefits by which Teton County was unjustly enriched as a result of the 
public improvements constructed by Burns pursuant to the terms of the Agreement. 
Complaint ,r 3 [R, p. 2]. 
(ii) Parties. 
4. Burns Concrete, Inc. is an Idaho corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale 
of concrete, and Burns Holdings, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company engaged in the 
1 
Verified Complaint for: (i) Declaratory Judgment, (ii) Breach of Contract and 
Rescission, (iii) Unjust Enrichment, filed May 21, 2013 ("Complaint") [R, pp. 1-24]. 
2 
Answer and Counterclaim, filed June 11, 2013 ("Answer") [R, pp. 25-31 ]. 
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holding of real property, with the two companies being under common ownership and together 
holding all rights of the defined Developer under the Agreement. Complaint 14 [R, p. 2]. 
5. Teton County is a political subdivision of the State ofldaho. Complaint 15 [R, p. 
3]; Answer 15 [R, p. 26]. 
(iii) Jurisdiction and Venue. 
6. Jurisdiction exists in the trial court under Idaho Code § 5-514. Complaint 'if 6 [R, 
p. 3); Answer 16 [R, p. 26]. 
7. Venue exists in Teton County under Idaho Code§ 5-403. Complaint 17 [R; p. 3]; 
Answer 1 7 [R, p. 26]. 
(iv) Relevant Terms of the Agreement. 
8. The real property subjected to the Agreement is located within the Area of Impact 
of the City of Driggs, Teton County, Idaho and described in Exhibit "A" to the Agreement (the 
"Property"). Complaint 18 [R, p. 3]; Answer 18 [R, p. 26]. 
9. Pursuant to Paragraph 1 (titled, Zoning Ordinance Amendment) of the 
Agreement, Teton County agreed to "adopt an ordinance amending the Driggs Area of Impact 
Zoning map to rezone the property to Ml." The Property was thereafter rezoned by Teton 
County to Ml (Light Industrial). Complaint 19 [R, p. 3]; Answer 19 [R, p. 27]. 
10. Pursuant to Paragraph 2 (titled, Conditions on Development) of the Agreement: 
The sole use allowed and restrictions pursuant to this 
conditional rezone as reflected in this Agreement are as follows: 
a. The property shall be used exclusively for the 
operation of a ready-mix concrete manufacturing plant. 
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b. . .. This development and operation shall be subject 
to the following terms and conditions, in addition to the other 
terms hereof: 
(i) Developer intends to operate a Ready-Mix 
Concrete Manufacturing Facility (a "Facility") on the property. 
(ii) All operations on the property shall comply 
with all applicable and governing local, state or U.S. ordinances 
and laws relating to dust, noise, water quality and air quality. 
(iii) Attached as Exhibit "B"-Site Plan, and 
Exhibit "C"-Building Elevations, and by this reference 
incorporated herein are plans for construction of Developer's 
intended permanent facility ("Permanent Facility"). 
(iv) Immediately upon execution of this 
Agreement, Developer shall order and commence construction of 
the Permanent Facility. The installation of the Permanent Facility 
shall be completed within eighteen (18) months of execution of 
this Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting from 
weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or 
any other act of force majeure or action beyond Developer's 
control. 
(v) In order to facilitate and support the 
construction of the Permanent Facility and to allow the Developer 
to expedite commercial operations, the Developer shall erect and 
operate a temporary concrete batch plant on site as shown in 
Exhibit "B"-Site Plan and Exhibit "D". 
(vi) In the event that the Permanent Facility is 
not completed within the time allowed herein, the County shall 
have the right to revoke the authority to operate the Temporary 
Facility. The grant of authority of the Temporary Facility is to 
allow Developer to operate Developer's business until the 
Permanent Facility is constructed. The authority to operate the 
Temporary Facility shall terminate upon completion of the 
Permanent Facility even if sooner than the described eighteen (18) 
month time period. 
(Underscoring added.) Complaint ,r 10 [R, pp. 3-4]; Answer ,r 10 [R, p. 27]. 
11. Pursuant to Paragraph 5 (titled, Zoning Reversion Consent) of the Agreement: 
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The execution of this Agreement shall be deemed written 
consent by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property 
to its prior designation upon failure to comply with the conditions 
imposed by this Agreement. No reversion shall take place until 
after a hearing on this matter pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-651 lA. 
Upon notice and hearing, as provided in this Agreement and in 
Idaho Code §67-6509, if the property described in attached Exhibit 
"A" is not used as approved, or if the approved use ends or is 
abandoned, the Board of County Commissioners may, upon 
receiving a recommendation from the City's governing board, 
order that the property will revert to the zoning designation (and 
land uses allowed by that zoning designation) existing immediately 
prior to the rezone action, i.e., the property shall revert back to the 
C3, Service and Highway Commercial zoning designation. 
(Underscoring added.) Complaint 1 11 [R, p. 4]; Answer 1 11 [R, p. 27). 
12. Pursuant to Paragraph 12.b of the Agreement, the Agreement runs with the land, 
binds the Property in perpetuity, and inures to the benefit of and is enforceable by Developer and 
its assigns. Complaint 113 [R, p. 5]; Answer 113 [R, p. 27]. 
13. Finally, Paragraph 2.b(iii) and Exhibit C of the Agreement expressly provide for 
and depict Bums' construction of its desired 75' Permanent Facility. Complaint 114 [R, p. 5]; 
Answer 114 [R, p. 27]. 
(v) General Allegations. 
14. When considering whether to expand its business operations into Teton County, 
Burns met with representatives of both Teton County and the City of Driggs to determine 
whether and where to construct a concrete batch plant in the area. All such representatives 
encouraged Burns to construct such a plant, with both Teton County and the City of Driggs 




15. Bums purchased the Property based on the representations made by Teton County 
and the City of Driggs, and with the reasonable expectancy of entering into the Agreement with 
Teton County, after having first filed for a change of zoning for the Property to allow for the 
construction and operation of the proposed Permanent Facility. Complaint 124 [R, p. 7]. 
16. In accordance with Teton County's requirements, the City of Driggs' Planning 
and Zoning Commission heard on July 11, 2007 and unanimously recommended for approval by 
Teton County both the Agreement and the issuance of a conditional use permit allowing the 75' 
height of the Permanent Facility (the "CUP"). Complaint 1 15 [R, p. 15]; Answer 1 15 [R, p. 27]. 
17. Thereafter, on or about August 31, 2007 Teton County and Bums entered into the 
Agreement and Teton County caused the Agreement to be recorded. Complaint 116 [R, p. 5]; 
Answer 116 [R, p. 27]. 
18. Following the execution of the Agreement, Burns expended many hundreds of 
thousands of dollars constructing and implementing the commitments imposed under the 
Agreement, including without limitation (a) erecting and operating a temporary concrete batch 
plant (the "Temporary Facility") required under Paragraph 2.b(v) of the Agreement, which 
required Bums to incur substantial expense for site demolition, remediating the site for prior 
waste disposal, clearing and grubbing the site, extending utilities to the site, and transporting to 
and erecting on the site the Temporary Facility; (b) constructing the road and highway 
improvements required under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the Agreement, which required Bums to incur 
substantial expense for barrier fencing with concrete foundations, new turn lanes, landscaping, 
and performance bonds; and ( c) applying for and taking all actions necessary to obtain the CUP 
and zoning variance required to construct the Permanent Facility. Complaint ,i 17 [R, p. 6]. 
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Substantially all, if not 100%, of the work described in parts (a) and (b) of this paragraph was 
completed prior to November 15, 2007. Affidavit of Kirk Bums, filed November 5, 2014, ,r 5 
[R, p. 89]. 
19. On November 15, 2007, after Bums had incurred the substantial costs required by 
the Agreement, and notwithstanding the unanimous recommendation for approval by the City of 
Driggs' Planning and Zoning Commission and the determination of Teton County's attorney that 
the Agreement was a valid and binding contract, the Teton County Board of County 
Commissioners voted to deny the CUP. Complaint ,r 18 [R, p. 6]. 
20. Bums thereafter confirmed with Teton County's director of planning and zoning, 
Kurt Hibbert, on November 20, 2007 that Teton County would not issue a building permit for the 
construction of the Permanent Facility specified in the Agreement. Complaint ,r 19 [R, p. 6]. 
21. After the Idaho Supreme Court held that a provision in the relevant zoning 
ordinance was void and that Burns must therefore obtain a zoning variance from Teton County, 
rather than the CUP, in order to construct the Permanent Facility,3 Bums applied for the required 
variance, which the Teton County Board of County Commissioners voted to deny on September 
13, 2012. Affidavit of Kimberly D. Evans Ross, filed August 11, 2014, ,r 4 and Ex. G [R, pp. 51 
& 59-60]. 
3 
See Burns Holdings, LLC v. Teton Cnty. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 152 Idaho 440, 443-44, 272 
P.3d 412, 415-16 (2012) (hereinafter "Burns Holdings I"). 
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22. Teton County admits "there is no legal means currently available to [Bums] to 
build the promised batch plant," id., because Burns cannot make the showing required for a 
. • 4 
zomng variance. 
23. Bums undertook every act reasonably possible to obtain the CUP and zoning 
variance required by Teton County for Bums to construct the Permanent Facility, both of which 
Teton County refused to issue. Complaint ,r 20 [R, p. 6]. 
24. Bums could not construct the Permanent Facility without an amendment to the 
ordinances of Teton County. Complaint ,r 21 [R, p. 7]; Answer ,r 21 [R, p. 28]. 
25. Burns has operated the Temporary Facility in accordance with the terms of the 
Agreement. However, Burns has not ever been able to construct the Permanent Facility by 
reason of actions and inaction by Teton County over which Bums has no control. Complaint 
,r 25 [R, p. 7]. See also Agreement ,r 10 ("Developer agrees to comply with all ... county and 
local laws, rules and regulations, which appertain to the subject property."). 
26. By letter dated October 4, 2012 from its Board of County Commissioners, Teton 
County revoked Bums' authority to operate the Temporary Facility and demanded its immediate 
removal from the Property. Complaint ,r 32 [R, p. 9]; Answer ,r 32 [R, p. 30]. 
27. In response to Teton County's revocation and demand, counsel for Bums 
provided Teton County written notice by letter dated October 15, 2012 that Teton County's 
action constituted a breach of the Agreement and demanded the following: 
4 
To obtain a variance, Burns is required "to show that there was undue hardship because 
of the site characteristics and that the variance would not conflict with the public interest." 
Burns Holdings I, supra. In regards to the first of these requirements, Burns acknowledges that 
the Property is without problematic site characteristics. 
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(i) If the County contends the Developer has breached 
or is in default of the Agreement, that the County provide the 
Developer with "not less than thirty (30) days' Notice of Default, 
in writing ... [ and] specify the nature of the alleged default and, 
where appropriate, the manner and period of time during which 
said default may be satisfactorily cured"-in accordance with the 
requirements imposed under Paragraph 8 of the Agreement; 
(ii) That the County take no further action adverse to 
the Developer's rights under the Agreement without first providing 
a written Notice of Default and opportunity to cure the alleged 
default-as is expressly required by Paragraph 8 of the Agreement; 
and 
(iii) That the County provide the Developer with a 
written retraction of its notice of revocation dated October 4, 2012, 
within 30 days of the County's receipt of this letter-which 
demand is hereby made subject to the Developer's reservation of 
rights to treat any further action by the County that is adverse to 
the Developer's rights under the Agreement or the County's failure 
to retract its notice of revocation within said 30 days as a 
repudiation of the County's obligations under the Agreement. 
Complaint -ii 33 [R, pp. 9-10]; Answer -ii 33 [R, p. 30]. 
28. Nevertheless, by letter dated October 23, 2012 from the Teton County 
Prosecuting Attorney, Teton County resubmitted to the City of Driggs a previously withdrawn 
application for a recommendation by the city that the zoning of the Property should revert to C3 
(Service and Highway Commercial). Although a final decision on the application was tabled by 
the City of Driggs' Planning and Zoning Commission, Teton County's proposal to rezone the 
Property remains pending. Complaint 126 [R, p. 7]; Answer -ii 26 [R, p. 29]. 
29. Additionally, by letter dated November 5, 2012 from the Teton County 
Prosecuting Attorney to Burns' counsel, Teton County asserted that the clause in Paragraph 
2.b(iv) of the Agreement extending the 18-month period to construct the Permanent Facility "is 
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inapplicable to the present situation" and threatened to file suit to force Bums' removal of the 
Temporary Facility from the Property. Complaint 128 [R, p. 8]; Answer 128 [R, p. 29]. 
30. Thus, Teton County responded to Bums' October 15 notice and demand 
referenced in paragraph 27 above, (a) by acting to rezone the Property and (b) by the Teton 
County Prosecuting Attorney's November 5 response referenced in paragraph 29 above, which 
rejected all of the demands made by Bums and threatened suit to compel Bums' removal of the 
Temporary Facility from the Property. Complaint 134 [R, p. 10]; Answer 134 [R, p. 30]. 
31. Bums thereafter commenced this civil action on May 21, 2013 after the parties 
were unable to resolve their dispute. Complaint 1 [R, p. 1]. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in ruling that the force majeure clause in the Agreement 
does not suspend Bums' obligation under the Agreement to construct the Permanent Facility? 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that the doctrine of prevention of performance does 
not suspend or discharge Bums' obligation under the Agreement to construct the Permanent 
Facility? 
3. Did the trial court err in ruling that the doctrine of impossibility of performance 
does not suspend or discharge Bums' obligation under the Agreement to construct the Permanent 
Facility? 
4. Did the trial court err in ruling that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel does not estop 
Teton County from rezoning the Property? 
-12-
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III. LEGAL ST AND ARDS 
The dispute between Burns and Teton County arises out of the terms of the Agreement, 
with the gist of the dispute being over whether the requirement to construct the Permanent 
Facility has been extended by the occurrence of actions beyond Burns' control.
5 
The applicable 
legal standards with respect to this Court's interpretation of the Agreement and the elemental 
issues in dispute are set forth in detail in Knipe Land Company v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 259 
P.3d 595 (2011), as follows: 
As provided by this Court in Potlatch Education Ass 'n v. 
Potlach School District No. 285: 
When interpreting a contract, this Court 
begins with the document's language. In the 
absence of ambiguity, the document must be 
construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, 
according to the meaning derived from the plain 
wording of the instrument. Interpreting an 
unambiguous contract and determining whether 
there has been a violation of that contract is an issue 
of law subject to free review. A contract term is 
ambiguous when there are two different reasonable 
interpretations or the language is nonsensical. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of 
law, but interpreting an ambiguous term is an issue 
of fact. 
Whether an ambiguity exists in a legal instrument is a 
question of law, over which this Court exercises free review. 
5 
As also set forth in the foregoing Summary of the Facts (hereinafter "Facts"), Paragraph 
2.b(iv) of the Agreement provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
The installation of the Permanent Facility shall be completed within eighteen (18) 
months of execution of this Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting 
from weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or any other 
act of force majeure or action beyond Developer's control. 
Facts 1 10 (underscoring added). (The foregoing contractual provision is hereinafter referred to 
as the "Force Majeure Clause.") 
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Where a legal instrument is found to be unambiguous the legal 
effect must be decided by the district court as a matter of law; it is 
only when that instrument is found to be ambiguous that evidence 
as to the meaning of that instrument may be submitted to the finder 
of fact. "[E]vidence of custom or usage may not be introduced to 
vary or contradict the terms of a plain and unambiguous 
contract. ... " 
Knipe Land Co., 151 Idaho at 454-55, 259 P.3d at 600-01 (internal and concluding citations 
omitted). 
Neither Bums nor Teton County has asserted during this dispute that the Force Majeure 
Clause quoted in note 5, supra, is ambiguous and thus not subject to this Court's interpretation as 
a matter of a law. See 1st MSJ Decision 8 ("Both parties agree that the Agreement is not 
ambiguous.") [R, p. 125]. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
As set forth in the Complaint, Bums expended many hundreds of thousands of dollars 
constructing and implementing the commitments imposed under the Agreement following its 
execution, including constructing public improvements. Facts 118. Nevertheless, Teton County 
has steadfastly refused to take the action necessary to allow Bums to construct the Permanent 
Facility. Facts 11 19-21. And as the undisputed facts in this case establish, the sole reason 
Bums has not constructed the Permanent Facility is because Teton County has prevented Bums 
from doing so. Facts 11 22-25. Bums therefore submits that the fundamental question distills 
down to whether Bums could control either (i) Teton County's issuance of the CUP or zoning 
variance Bums applied for in order to construct the Permanent Facility or (ii) Teton County's 
amendment of its ordinances so as to otherwise allow Burns to construct the Permanent Facility. 
-14-
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A. Application Of The Force Majeure Clause Should Be Held To Have Suspended 
Burns' Obligation To Construct The Permanent Facility. 
Teton County's counterclaims for breach of contract (Count I) and declaratory judgment 
(Count II) are both based on limiting the meaning of the phrase "any other ... actions beyond 
Developer's control" in the Force Majeure Clause to exclude Teton County's failure to issue the 
CUP, zoning variance, and building permit Bums required to construct the Permanent Facility. 
See Counterclaim
6 
,i,i 15 & 43 [R, pp. 33 & 37-38].
7 
The trial court, which held as set forth 
below, decided the question in favor of Teton County based on the opinion of the federal district 
court for Rhode Island in URI Cogeneration Partners, L.P. v. Board of Governors for Higher 
Education, 915 F.Supp. 1267 (D.R.I. 1996): 
The reasoning of the court in URI Cogeneration Partners is 
persuasive here. Section 2.b.(iv) of the Agreement does not 
include failure to obtain zoning approval within the list of 
examples of a force majeure. As in URI Cogeneration Partners, 
the catchall phrase in Section 2.b(iv), "or action beyond 
Developer's control," should not be given expansive meaning, but 
should be confined to things of the same kind or nature as 
"weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment." 
Bums was aware it would need approval for a CUP or zoning 
variance prior to entering the agreement-consequently, the failure 
to procure the zoning variance was foreseeable. Bums states that it 
could not have foreseen Teton County's denial of the CUP and 
zoning variance because Bums applied for the CUP prior to the 
parties' execution of the Agreement. Bums adds that Teton 
County implicitly approved the 75-foot height when it executed the 
Agreement. However, Section 10 of the Agreement 
unambiguously requires Bums to comply with all applicable laws. 
Bums has acknowledged that it cannot satisfy the standard for a 
zoning variance. Additionally, during the February 26, 2007 
6 
Answer and Counterclaim, filed June 11, 2013 ("Counterclaim") [R, pp. 32-39]. 
7 
Burns denied these allegations in its Amended Reply to Counterclaim, filed December 
29, 2014 ("Reply"), at ,i,i 7 and 26 [R, pp. 144 & 146]. 
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public hearing, the Board of County Commissioners expressed 
concerning [sic] regarding the plant facility being 45 feet tall. 
Bums should have foreseen that there was, at a minimum, a risk 
that its request for a CUP and/or zoning variance could or would 
be denied. Burns and Teton County could have provided for the 
eventuality that a zoning variance would not be obtained. They did 
not, thereby requiring Burns to assume the risk of not obtaining the 
variance. [,I] Burns's failure to complete construction of the 
permanent facility within 18 months is not excused by Teton 
County's denial of the zoning variance. 
1st MSJ Decision 12 (underscoring added) [R, p. 129]. 
The trial court erred in applying the decision in URI Cogeneration Partners to decide the 
present dispute for multiple reasons. 
It should be clearly understood as an initial matter that the force majeure clause at issue 
in URI Cogeneration Partners was included in a contract between the two parties to that lawsuit 
but that the required zoning approval in question was denied by a stranger to the contract, the 
town of South Kingston. 915 F.Supp. at 1286. Thus, as stated in the language used in 
determining the application of force majeure clauses, 
8 
while the parties to a contract may well 
anticipate that a local jurisdiction not bound by contractual obligation to either party may decide 
not to issue a zoning approval, it was plainly unanticipated here that Teton County-one of the 
parties to the Agreement-would not promptly issue the zoning approvals required for Burns to 
8 
The term "force majeure" is defined in the most current version of Black's Law 
Dictionary to mean: 
An event or effect that can be neither anticipated nor controlled; esp., an 
unexpected event that prevents someone from doing or completing something that 
he or she had agreed or officially planned to do. The term includes both acts of 
nature (e.g., floods and hurricanes) and acts of people (e.g., riots, strikes, and 
wars). 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 761 (10th ed. 2014). 
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construct the Permanent Facility depicted in the Agreement. The unforseeability of Teton 
County's unexpected change of heart and denial of Burns' CUP application is particularly 
obvious because Burns and Teton County entered into the Agreement after the City of Driggs' 
Planning and Zoning Commission heard and unanimously recommended for approval by Teton 
County both the Agreement and the issuance of the CUP allowing the 75' height of the 
Permanent Facility. Facts 1116-17. Accordingly, the facts before the district court in URI 
Cogeneration Partners are readily distinguishable from those presented in this appeal. 
In addition, the rule adopted by the federal district court in URI Cogeneration Partners, 
which purports to be grounded in the law of New York and, more specifically, the decision in 
Ke! Kim Corporation v. Central j\;farkets, Inc., 519 N.E.2d 295 (N.Y. 1987),
9 
is at odds with the 
facts presented in Ke! Kim. The obvious conflict is illustrated by the following discussion of Kel 
Kim in Specialty Foods of Indiana, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 997 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2013): 
Additionally, in support of its argument that the parties' 
force majeure provision is inapplicable in this instance, Specialty 
Foods cites Kel Kim Corp. v. Central Markets, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 
900, 524 N.Y.S.2d 384, 519 N.E.2d 295 (1987). In Ke! Kim, the 
force majeure provision provided: 
If either party to this Lease shall be delayed or 
prevented from the performance of any obligation 
through no fault of their own by reason of labor 
disputes, inability to procure materials, failure of 
utility service, restrictive governmental laws or 
regulations, riots, insurrection, war, adverse 
weather, Acts of God, or other similar causes 
beyond the control of such party, the performance 
9 
See URI Cogeneration Partners, 915 F.Supp. at 1286-87. 
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of such obligation shall be excused for the period of 
the delay. 
524 N.Y.S.2d 384, 519 N.E.2d at 296 n.*. The New York Court of 
Appeals determined that the force majeure provision did not apply 
because the event that prevented Kel Kim's performance under the 
contract was neither specifically included in the force majeure 
provision nor generally included within the provision's catchall 
phrase "or other similar causes beyond the control of such party." 
The court explained that the event (i.e., the inability of Kel Kim to 
procure and maintain liability insurance) was of a different kind 
and nature from the particular events listed in the force majeure 
provision such that it could not be considered a "similar cause." 
Specialty Foods' reliance upon Ke! Kim is misguided. The 
force majeure clause in Ke! Kim is distinguishable from the clause 
in the instance case primarily due to its inclusion of the phrase "or 
other similar causes." This is a limiting phrase that the court 
determined required the event causing the non-performance of a 
party to be similar to the events specifically spelled out in the 
provision of the parties' contract. The provision in the present case 
does not contain such a restrictive clause. Rather, the parties here 
agreed that when an event occurs, the cause of which is "any other 
reason" not within the reasonable control of the parties, the 
performance of obligations under the agreement shall be excused. 
Thus, instead of a limiting clause, the [ contracting parties] 
included broad terminology that does not require the non-
performance triggering event to be similar to the specific causes 
listed in the force majeure provision. We remain mindful that we 
must look to the specific language of the contract. See Va. Power 
[Energy Mktg., Inc. v. Apache Corp., 297 S.W.3d 397, 402 (Tex. 
App. 2009)]. Accordingly, the underlying rationale of the decision 
in Kel Kim is not applicable here. 
Specialty Foods, 997 N.E.2d at 28 (underscoring added). Thus, the force majeure clause at issue 
in Ke! Kim was inconsistent with the broad terminology used in the force majeure clauses in both 
Specialty Foods and URI Cogeneration Partner/
0 
(as well as that used in the Agreement). 
10 
The relevant portion of the force majeure clause at issue in URI Co generation Partners 
is as follows: 
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Moreover, the "foreseeable" limitation imposed on force maJeure clauses in URI 
Cogeneration Partners (as well as by the trial court in this dispute) was expressly rejected in 
Specialty Foods on the following grounds: 
Historically, the theory of force majeure embodied the 
concept that parties could be relieved of performance of their 
contractual obligations when the performance was prevented by 
causes beyond their control, such as an act of God. However, 
much of the theory's "historic underpinning have fallen by the 
wayside" with the result that force majeure is now "little more than 
a descriptive phrase without much inherent substance." Indeed, 
the scope and effect of a force majeure clause depends on the 
specific contract language and not on any traditional definition of 
the term. In other words, when the parties have defined the nature 
of force majeure in their agreement, that nature dictates the 
application, effect, and scope of force majeure with regard to that 
agreement and those parties, and reviewing courts are not at liberty 
to rewrite the contract or interpret it in a manner which the parties 
never intended. The party seeking to excuse its performance under 
a force majeure clause bears the burden of proof of establishing 
that defense. 
We begin by determining the intent of the parties through 
examination of the language they used in the contract. The force 
majeure provision in the UMO Agreement provides: 
As used in this Agreement, "Force Majeure" means causes beyond the 
reasonable control of and without the fault or negligence of the party claiming 
Force Majeure. If either Party shall be unable to carry out any of its obligations 
under this Agreement due to events beyond the reasonable control of and without 
the fault or negligence of the party claiming Force Majeure-including, but not 
limited to an act of God; sabotage; accidents; appropriation or diversion of steam 
energy, equipment, materials or commodities by rule or order of any 
governmental or judicial authority having jurisdiction thereof; any changes in 
applicable laws or regulations affecting performance; war; blockage; insurrection; 
riot; labor dispute; labor or material shortage; fuel storage; fire; explosion; flood; 
nuclear emergency; epidemic; landslide; lightning; earthquake or similar 
catastrophic occurrence-this Agreement shall remain in effect, but the affected 
Party's obligations shall be suspended for the period the affected Party is unable 
to perform because of the disabling circumstances provided that .... 
915 F.Supp. at 1276 (underscoring added). 
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In the event Century Center or [Specialty Foods] 
shall be delayed or hindered or prevented from the 
performance of any obligation required under this 
Agreement by reason of strikes[,] lockouts, inability 
to procure labor or materials, failure of power, fire 
or other casualty, acts of God, restrictive 
governmental laws or regulations, riots, 
insurrection, war or any other reason not within the 
reasonable control of Century Center or [Specialty 
Foods], as the case may be, then the performance of 
such obligation shall be excused for the period of 
such delay and the period for the performance of 
any such act shall be extended for a period 
equivalent to the period of such delay. 
The parties agree that the specific language from the force majeure 
provision in the UMO Agreement with which we are concerned is 
the phrase "any other reason not within the reasonable control of 
Century Center." 
Specialty Foods argues that the force majeure provision of 
the UMO Agreement is inapplicable to excuse the Century 
Center's performance because the termination of the Management 
and License Agreements was "not unforeseeable." However, the 
force majeure provision in this case contains nothing about 
foreseeability, and Specialty Foods points to neither terms in the 
provision nor in the remainder of the parties' contract in support of 
its argument. The scope and effect of a force majeure clause 
depends on the specific contract language. 
Further, there is no evidence before us that the bargaining 
between the parties was not free and open. The City, the Century 
Center, and Specialty Foods are sophisticated parties presumably 
represented by counsel who were at liberty to define the nature of 
force majeure in whatever manner they desired. We decline to 
rewrite the parties' contract by interjecting into the force majeure 
provision a requirement of foreseeability. 
Specialty Foods, 997 N.E.2d at 27-28 (internal and concluding citations omitted). Although not 
all authorities are in agreement on the question, multiple other courts have also rejected the 
"foreseeable" limitation imposed on force majeure clauses in URI Cogeneration Partners and by 
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the trail court below for the reasons articulated in Specialty Foods. See, e.g., Perlman v. Pioneer 
Ltd. P 'ship, 918 F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1990); Vinegar Hill Zinc Co. v. United States, 276 
F.2d 13, 15-16 (Ct. Cl. 1960). 
Finally, and decisively, the "catchall phrase" and "foreseeable" limitations imposed on 
force majeure clauses in URI Cogeneration Partners and by the trial court below are also 
inconsistent with established Idaho precedent. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals addressed the proper interpretation of a catchall phrase in 
Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742,689 P.2d 1289 (Ct. App. 1984): 
The Victors assert that the Andersons should not have been 
awarded hay-cutting expenses incurred in harvesting the Victors' 
share of the hay. The contract provides that the Victors "shall pay 
one-fourth of all normal harvesting expenses, including ... bailing 
[sic], hauling and stacking of hay .... " The Victors request that 
we apply the maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the 
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another) to determine 
that the inclusion of specific activities-baling, hauling and 
stacking of hay-implies an intent to exclude all other activities 
from the meaning of "harvesting". That maxim "applies to 
contracts ... and hence, the expression in a contract of one or more 
things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed." 17 
Am.Jur.2d Contracts§ 255 (1964). (Footnotes omitted.) 
We must construe this contract so as to give effect to every 
part of it, if possible. Wright v. Village of Wilder, 63 Idaho 122, 
117 P.2d 1002 (1941). Here, the phrase "all normal harvesting 
expenses" sufficiently expresses the range of activities to be 
included as expenses so as to make that maxim inapplicable. To 
interpret the contract otherwise would result in nullifying the 
phrase "all normal harvesting expenses." This we refuse to do. 
106 Idaho at 749-50, 682 P.2d at 1296-97 (underscoring added). The rule articulated in Ace 
Realty requiring a court to construe a contract "so as to give effect to every part of it, if possible" 
has been repeatedly followed and quoted by both of Idaho's appellate courts. See, e.g., 
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Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 735, 9 P.3d 534,538 (2000); Twin Lakes 
Viii. Prop. Ass 'n Inc., 124 Idaho 132, 137, 857 P.2d 611, 616 (1993); George v. Univ. of Idaho, 
121 Idaho 30, 36, 822 P.2d 549,555 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Accordingly, the trial court's interpretation of the Force Majeure Clause so as to 
effectively nullify the phrase "any other act of force majeure or action beyond Developer's 
control" is inconsistent with Idaho's established rule that every phrase of a contract be given 
effect if possible. See also City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425,437,299 P.3d 232,244 
(2013) ("This Court has no "roving power to rewrite contracts to make them more equitable.' 
Thus, when weighing various interpretations of contracts, we consider the language of the 
agreement as 'the best indication of [the parties'] intent." (Internal and concluding citations 
omitted.)). Nor is the trial court's interpretation of the Force Majeure Clause consistent with the 
leading Idaho authority construing the application of force majeure clauses in contracts, Idaho 
Power Company v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 (2000). 
Similar to the broad terminology used in the force majeure clause at issue m URI 
Cogeneration Partners
11 
(as well as that used in the Agreement), the force majeure clause at 
issue in Idaho Power provided, in relevant part, as follows: 
11 
[F]orce majeure or an event of force majeure means any cause 
beyond the control of the Seller or of Idaho Power which, despite 
the exercise of due diligence, such Party is unable to prevent or 
overcome, including but not limited to an act of God, fire, flood, 
explosion, strike, sabotage, an act of the public enemy, civil or 
military authority, court orders, laws or regulations, insurrection 
or riot, an act of the elements or lack of precipitation resulting in 
reduced water flows for power production purposes. If either 
party is rendered wholly or in part unable to perform its 
See supra note 10. 
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obligations under this Agreement because of an event of force 
majeure, both parties shall be excused from whatever 
performance is affected by the event of force majeure, provided 
that .... 
Idaho Power, 134 Idaho at 747-48, 9 P.3d at 1213-14 (bolding in original). Based on the 
foregoing provision, Cogeneration argued that acts of civil authority in revoking Cogeneration's 
permits constituted events of force majeure because doing so affected Cogeneration's ability to 
post the security required under the parties' agreement. Id. 
As the Idaho Supreme Court explained the question decided by the district court and 
presented on appeal: 
The district court concluded that although the actions of 
government agencies in revoking and suspending the required 
permits and certificates were events of force maieure as applied to 
the obligations of the parties for construction and operation, they 
did not affect Cogeneration's physical ability to deliver the 
required security in a timely manner and did not relieve 
Cogeneration of its obligation to deliver the security to Idaho 
Power. 
* * * 
Looking at the plain language of the contract, the district 
court correctly interpreted the force maieure clause as excusing 
only those obligations affected by an event of force majeure. 
Based upon the record, ample evidence exists indicating that the 
obligation to pay the security was not directly affected by the 
revocation and suspension of the required permits and certificates 
since Cogeneration and its financial partner Calpine could have 
posted the security but chose not to. As was correctly pointed out 
by the district court in its memorandum decision, Cogeneration and 
Calpine may not have wanted to tender the security deposit without 
assurance that Idaho Power would recognize the occurrence of 
events of force majeure, but nothing prevented them from doing 
so. Cogeneration argues that business sense prevented it from 
posting the security, for had it tendered the security without 
acknowledgment of events of force majeure by Idaho Power, by 
the terms of the Agreement, Cogeneration would have forfeited the 
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deposit when permitting delays prevented completion of the 
facility on time. We do not find this argument persuasive in light 
of the fact that had Cogeneration subsequently failed to complete 
the facility on time, it would have then been permitted to invoke 
the force maieure provision of the Agreement and excuse such 
breach, thereby avoiding forfeiture of its security deposit. 
Id. (underscoring added). Thus, both the district court and the Idaho Supreme Court decided that 
the broad terminology of the force majeure clause at issue in Idaho Power would apply to 
"actions of government agencies in revoking and suspending the required permits."
12 
The same 
rule should apply equally here to Teton County's failure to issue the CUP and building permit 
Bums required to construct the Permanent Facility, as well as to Teton County's failure to amend 
its ordinances so as to otherwise allow Bums to construct the Permanent Facility. 
In sum, then, the trial court erred in applying the decision in URI Cogeneration Partners 
to decide the present dispute for the following reasons: 
• The facts in URI Cogeneration Partners are readily distinguishable from those 
presented in this appeal. 
• The rule adopted in URI Cogeneration Partners is at odds with the very New 
York authority on which the rule was purportedly based. 
• The "catchall phrase" and "foreseeable" limitations imposed on force majeure 
clauses in URI Cogeneration Partners are not only inconsistent with persuasive 
12 
In support of its holding, the Supreme Court relied on the following rule, as previously 
discussed above: 
In construing a written instrument, this Court must consider it as whole and give 
meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible. See Magic Valley 
Radiology, P.A. v. Professional Business Services, Inc. 119 Idaho 558, 565, 808 
P.2d 1303, 1310 (1991). 
Idaho Power, 134 Idaho at 748, 9 P.3d at 1214. 
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authority from other state and federal courts, but they are inconsistent with 
established Idaho precedent. 
And for all these reasons, URI Cogeneration Partners is not the law ofldaho. 
Accordingly, application of the Agreement's Force Majeure Clause should be held to 
have suspended Burns' obligation to construct the Permanent Facility. 
B. Application Of The Doctrine Of Prevention Should Be Held To Have Suspended Or 
Discharged Burns' Obligation To Construct The Permanent Facility. 
13 
The doctrine of prevention is summarized in Williston on Contracts as follows: 
It is a general principle of contract law that if one party to a 
contract hinders, prevents or makes impossible performance by the 
other party, the latter's failure to perform will be excused. This 
general principle has been referred to as the doctrine of prevention. 
Under the doctrine, a contracting party whose performance of its 
promise is prevented by the other party is not obligated to perform 
and is excused from any further off er of performance. In turn, the 
preventing party is not allowed to recover damages for the 
resulting nonperformance or otherwise benefit from its own 
wrongful acts. 
When a promisor prevents, hinders, or renders impossible 
the occurrence of a condition precedent to its promise to perform, 
or to the performance of a return promise, the promisor is not 
relieved of the obligation to perform and may not legally terminate 
the contract for nonperformance. Furthermore, the promisor may 
not invoke the other party's nonperformance as a defense when it 
is sued on the contract. In short, under the doctrine of prevention, 
when a party to a contract causes the failure of the performance of 
the obligation due, it cannot in any wav take advantage of that 
failure. 
* * * 
The principle that prevention by one party excuses 
performance by the other applies to both the performance of a 
13 
Burns pleaded the doctrine of prevention of performance as an affirmative defense to 
Teton County's counterclaims. Reply ,r 31 [R, p. 147]. 
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condition and of a promise and may be laid down broadly as 
applying to every contract. Whether interference by one party to a 
contract amounts to prevention so as to excuse performance by the 
other party and constitute a breach by the interfering party is a 
question of fact to be decided by the jury under all of the proved 
facts and circumstances. 
* * * 
The rationale underlying the prevention doctrine, pursuant 
to which the nonperformance by one party to the contract is 
excused when the other party to the contract hinders, prevents, or 
makes impossible that performance, is two-fold. First, the doctrine 
is based on the long-established principle of law that a party should 
not be able to take advantage of its own wrongful act. Thus, one 
who prevents the fulfillment of a duty of performance under a 
contract may not then rely on the nonperformance which has been 
caused by the prevention. It is a principle of fundamental justice 
that if a promisor is personally responsible for the failure of 
performance, either of an obligation due the promisor or of a 
condition on which the promisor's liability depends, it cannot take 
advantage of the failure. 
Second, the principle of prevention is based on the implied 
agreement of the parties to a contract to proceed in good faith and 
cooperate in performing the contract in accordance with its 
expressed intent and, therefore, to refrain from committing any 
intentional act or omission that would interfere with the other party 
or prevent or make it impossible for the other party to perform. 
13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 39:3 & 39:6 (4th ed., updated May 2015) 
(underscoring added) (footnotes omitted). 
The leading authority on the application of the prevention doctrine as applied under Idaho 
law is Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738, 864 P.2d 184 (Ct. App. 1993). As the Idaho Court of 
Appeals there discussed, there are two distinct articulations of the type of conduct warranting 
application of the doctrine, 
14 
with the articulation adopted in Idaho being that the act of 
14 
As explained in Sullivan: 
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prevention must have been "outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the 
contract was executed." 124 Idaho at 743, 864 P.2d at 189 (emphasis added). 
In applying this principle to the facts in Sullivan, the Court of Appeals held as follows: 
The jury returned a verdict stating that Mr. Bullock had not 
substantially performed but that Mrs. Sullivan had unreasonably 
prevented his performance. There was substantial evidence from 
which the jury could conclude that Mr. Bullock's failure was to be 
excused by Mrs. Sullivan's act of denying access to her home. 
True, an employee did enter Mrs. Sullivan's home when he was 
not supposed to. However, when Mrs. Sullivan denied any further 
access to the home she acted in a manner that was outside the 
contemplation of the contract or the parties when they executed the 
contract. 
Id. (underscoring added). See also Peck Ormsby Constr. Co. v. City of Rigby, No. CV 10-545-S-
WBS, 2012 WL 5273087, at *4 (D. Idaho 2012) (finding a genuine issue of material fact "[s]ince 
it is not clear that rejection ... was 'outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the 
contract was executed"' (quoting Sullivan) (emphasis added)). 
Therefore, the question with respect to whether the prevention doctrine here applies 
under Idaho law is whether, at the time the Agreement was executed on August 31, 2007, the 
To excuse a party's nonperformance, however, the conduct of the party 
preventing performance must be "wrongful" and "in excess of their legal rights." 
17 A C.J.S. Contracts § 468. Other authorities have stated that the conduct of the 
paiiy preventing performance must be outside what was permitted in the contract 
and "unjustified," or outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the 
contract was executed. Godburn v. Meserve, 130 Conn. 723, 37 A.2d 235 (1944); 
Morton Buildings, Inc. v. Dept. of Human Resources, 10 Kan.App.2d 197, 695 
P.2d 450 (1985); Kooleraire Service and Installation Corp., v. Board of 
Education of the City of New York, 28 N.Y.2d 101, 320 N.Y.S.2d 46,268 N.E.2d 
782 (1971). Our Supreme Court has echoed this standard in Molyneux [v. Twin 
Falls Canal Co., 54 Idaho 619, 35 P.2d 651 (1934)] .... [i!] The issue of 
prevention was described in instruction twenty-two, which follows the theory 
stated in Molyneux that the act of prevention must have been unreasonable, in 
other words, outside the contemplation of the parties as expressed in the contract. 
124 Idaho at 742-43, 864 P.2d at 188-89 (underscoring added) (footnote omitted). 
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parties contemplated that Teton County would deny Bums the CUP and building permit required 
to construct the Permanent Facility and then, two years later, would first contest the validity of 
the applicable ordinance in order to avoid issuing Bums the zoning approvals Bums required. 
See Burns Holdings I, 152 Idaho at 443, 272 P.3d at 415. 
In this regard, because paragraphs 2.b(iv)-(v) of the Agreement require Burns to 
immediately commence construction of the Permanent Facility and to erect and operate the 
Temporary Facility, see Facts ~ 10, rather than delaying or conditioning Bums' performance 
until after Teton County approved the CUP application that was then pending before it, there can 
be no material question of fact but that the parties contemplated Teton County would promptly 
issue Bums the CUP and building permit required to construct the Permanent Facility when they 
executed the Agreement.
15 
Indeed, construction of the Permanent Facility without the CUP and 
a building permit would have been both illegal and proscribed by the terms of the Agreement.
16 
Therefore, unless Teton County intended for Bums to immediately breach the Agreement by 
either failing to commence construction of the Permanent Facility or by commencing 
construction before obtaining the required CUP and building permit-something Teton County 
has never asserted-Teton County must necessarily have "contemplated" it would promptly 
approve and issue the CUP Burns required when Teton County executed the Agreement. 
15 
If paragraphs 2.b(iv)-(v) of the Agreement were not dispositive, there would then be a 
material question of fact. See above quote from Williston and Sullivan, 124 Idaho at 743 n.2, 
864 P.2d at 189. However, Teton County has not submitted a scintilla of evidence supporting a 
finding that the parties did not intend Burns to immediately commence construction of the 
Permanent Facility following execution of the Agreement. Nor could any such evidence be 
considered without violating the parol evidence rule. 
16 
See Agreement ~ 10 ("Developer agrees to comply with all federal, state, county and 
local laws, rules and regulations, which pertain to the subject property.") [R, p. 17]. 
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Although Burns made all of the foregoing arguments to the trial court, and it 
acknowledged the controlling legal principle to be applied, see ]st MSJ Decision 13 [R, p. 130], 
the trial court ruled that the doctrine of frustration was inapplicable for the following reason: 
Because Section 10 of the Agreement required Bums to comply 
with all applicable rules and regulations, and under the language of 
[Idaho Code] Section 67-6516, the County Commissioners could 
not grant a zoning variance to the property in question, it was not 
unreasonable of Teton County to deny Burns the zoning variance. 
Teton County's actions in denying the zoning variance were not 
unreasonable and was not outside the parties' contemplation as 
expressed in the Agreement. 
Id. at 14 [R, p. 131]. Thus, the trial court's ruling is based on the September 13, 2012 vote of the 
Teton County Board of Commissioners to deny Burns' application for a zoning variance, see 
Facts 121-an event that occurred five years after the Agreement was executed on August 31, 
2007. 
Accordingly, because the trial court's holding fails to consider whether Teton County's 
denial of the CUP and refusal to issue Burns a building permit in November 2007, see Facts 11 
19-20, was outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the Agreement was 
executed, the trial court erred in ruling the prevention doctrine to be inapplicable. And based on 
the points and authorities discussed above, the doctrine should be held to have suspended or 
discharged Burns' obligation to construct the Permanent Facility. 
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C. Application Of The Doctrine Oflmpossibility Should Be Held To Have Suspended 
Or Discharged Burns' Obligation To Construct The Permanent Facility. 
17 
The general elements and application of the doctrine of impossibility were explained by 
the Idaho Court of Appeals in Sutheimer v. Stoltenberg, 127 Idaho 81, 896 P.2d 989 (Ct. App. 
1995): 
In Haessly v. Safeco Title Insurance Co., 121 Idaho 463, 
465,825 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1992), the Idaho Supreme Court stated 
that the doctrine of impossibility "operates to excuse performance 
when the bargained-for performance is no longer in existence or is 
no longer capable of being performed due to the unforeseen, 
supervening act of a third party." To establish impossibility: 
"(1) a contingency must occur; (2) performance must be 
impossible, not just more difficult or more expensive; and (3) the 
nonoccurrence of the contingency must be a basic assumption of 
the agreement." Id. 
Impossibility that is only temporary will not act to 
discharge a contractual obligation if the contract can yet be 
performed after the impossibility ceases. Culp v. Tri-County 
Tractor, Inc., 112 Idaho 894, 900, 736 P.2d 1348, 1354 
(Ct.App.1987). This is explained in Section 269 of the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS as follows: 
Impracticability of performance or frustration of 
purpose that is only temporary suspends the 
obligor's duty to perform while the impracticability 
or frustration exists but does not discharge this duty 
or prevent it from arising unless his performance 
after the cessation of the impracticability or 
frustration would be materially more burdensome 
than had there been no impracticability or 
frustration. 
See also Twin Harbors Lumber Co. v. Carrico, 92 Idaho 343, 348, 
442 P.2d 753, 758 (1968) (Under the doctrine of impossibility, if 
the existence of a specific thing is essential for performance, a duty 
17 
Burns pleaded the doctrine of impossibility of performance as an affirmative defense to 
Teton County's counterclaims. Reply 132 [R, p. 147]. 
-30-
21813.001\4852-1830-6093 v2 
to perfonn is discharged if the thing "subsequently is not in 
existence in time for seasonable performance." Emphasis added). 
Sutheimer, 127 Idaho at 85, 896 P.2d at 993 (emphasis in original). 
As set forth in the above quoted excerpt from the opinion in Sutheimer, there are three 
elements to a defense based on the doctrine of impossibility and all three are satisfied in the 
present dispute. Thus, the first element (a contingency must occur) was satisfied when the Idaho 
Supreme Court ruled that the CUP Bums sought could not be obtained because a provision in the 
relevant zoning ordinance was void.
18 
Facts , 21. The second element (performance must be 
impossible) was established by Teton County's denial of the variance Bums sought following the 
Supreme Court's decision in Burns Holdings I, Bums' admission that the Property is without 
problematic site conditions, and Teton County's admission that "there is no legal means 
currently available to [Bums] to build the promised batch plant .... " Facts,, 21- 22. And the 
third element (the nonoccurrence of the contingency must be a basic assumption of the 
agreement) is established by the fact that both Bums and Teton County thought the 75' 
Permanent Facility could be constructed upon the issuance of the CUP Bums had applied for in 
accordance with the then-existing zoning ordinances, with both the CUP application and the 
Agreement having already been recommended by the City of Driggs for approval by Teton 
County when the Agreement was executed by Bums and Teton County. Facts ,, 16-17. Indeed, 
as the Supreme Court found in Burns Holdings I, Teton County did not first raise the variance 
18 
The difference between Bums having to obtain the CUP, as the parties expected when 
the Agreement was executed, or a variance, as the Supreme Court held to be required and for 
which the Property does not qualify, is material for multiple reasons. See Burns Holdings I, 152 
Idaho at 444-45, 272 P.3d at 416-417. In fact, as a result of the change in the required approval 
Bums was deprived of any and all ability it had to construct the 75' Permanent Facility, 
including through a judicial challenge to Teton County's denial of the CUP. 
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requirement until two years after the CUP application was filed by Bums. 152 Idaho at 443, 272 
P.3d at 415. 
The foundation for Bums' defense of impossibility is set forth in Sections 261 and 264 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts ( 1981) (the "Restatement"), as adopted and applied in 
Landis v. Hodgson, 109 Idaho 252, 706 P.2d 1363 (Ct. App. 1985). The relevant portions from 
the opinion in Landis are as follows: 
In determining whether the non-occurrence of a particular 
event was a basic assumption, a court will look at all the 
circumstances, including the terms of the contract. The fact that 
the event was unforeseeable is significant in suggesting that the 
non-occurrence was a basic assumption. "If the superseding event 
was not reasonably foreseeable when the contract was made, the 
party claiming discharge can hardly be expected to have provided 
against its occurrence. However, if it was reasonably foreseeable, 
or even foreseen, the opposite conclusion does not necessarily 
follow." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, 
comment (c) (1981). 
One such superseding event has been the government 
imposition of a new law, regulation or order which makes the 
performance of a duty impractical. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 264 (1981 ). If such performance becomes 
impractical, i.e., if the order or regulation was an event the non-
occurrence of which was assumed at the time the contract was 
made, the person will be relieved of his duty to perform. 
* * * 
[A]s stated in Lane v. Dashiell, 195 Md. 677, 75 A.2d 348, 353-54 
(1950): 
It is a general rule of the common law that 
when the impossibility of performance arises after 
the formation of the contract, the failure of the 
promisor to perform is not excused. This rule was 
founded on the theory that if the promiser makes his 
promise unconditionally, he takes the risk of being 
held liable even though performance should become 
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impossible by circumstances beyond his control. 
The unjust consequences of this general rule gave 
rise to certain exceptions. One of these is that a 
contractual duty is discharged where performance is 
subsequently prevented or prohibited by a judicial, 
executive. or administrative order, in the absence of 
circumstances showing either a contrary intention or 
contributing fault on the part of the person subject 
to the duty. [Citations omitted.] But an order 
which interferes with the performance of the 
contract is not an excuse if the circumstances 
surrounding the formation of the contract are such 
as to indicate that the possibility of such 
interference was recognized and the risk of it was 
assumed by the promiser. 
Lane is cited as authority in Acme Moving and Storage 
Corporation v. Bower, 269 Md. 478, 306 A.2d 545 (1973). In 
Acme, a lease agreement was executed for a warehouse. The 
landlord had to obtain a special variance to build a totally enclosed 
warehouse. The variance was granted subject to ten conditions 
regarding fencing, landscaping, parking and vehicular access. The 
landscaping plan had to be submitted to the county planning board 
for approval. A plan was submitted; however, it was not approved. 
The board promulgated its own plan which provided for the 
removal of a chain-link fence and sidewalk surrounding the 
buildings. Without the fence and sidewalk the warehouse did not 
comply with the zoning law as a totally enclosed warehouse and 
could not receive a use and occupancy permit which was required 
in the lease. The Maryland Court of Appeals held the tenant could 
not sue for specific performance of the lease. No fault was found 
on the part of the landlord in failing to obtain the use and 
occupancy permit. There was no suggestion that the refusal to 
issue the use and occupancy permit was foreseeable or that the 
landlord assumed the risk for such refusal. Therefore, the defense 
of impossibility of performance was properly available to him. 
Landis, l 09 Idaho at 256-57, 706 P.2d at 1367-68 (underscoring added). 
Burns therefore submits that the application of the doctrine of impossibility to the present 




Moreover, assuming the facts in Landis can be meaningfully distinguished based on 
Burns' (unknowingly) having to obtain a variance at the time the Agreement was signed, Burns 
submits that Idaho law should be extended to adopt the parallel provisions in Section 266(1) of 
the Restatement. For as explained in Comment a to Section 264 of the Restatement: 
19 
Rationale. This Section, like the two that precede it, states a 
specific instance for the application of the rule stated in § 261. It is 
"a basic assumption on which the contract was made" that the law 
will not directly intervene to make performance impracticable 
when it is due. Therefore, if supervening governmental action 
prohibits a performance or imposes requirements that make it 
impracticable, the duty to render that performance is discharged, 
subject to the qualifications stated in § 261. . . . If the prohibition 
or prevention already exists at the time of the making of the 
contract, the rule stated in § 266(1) rather than that stated in § 261 
controls, and this Section applies for the purpose of that rule as 
well. See Comment a to § 266. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 264, cmt. a (underscoring added). 
Thus, the fact that the law required Bums to obtain a variance at the time the Agreement 
was signed (as held over four years later in Burns Holdings I) merely means that the applicable 
19 
Section 264 provides: "If the performance of a duty is made impracticable by having 
to comply with a domestic or foreign governmental regulation or order, that regulation or order is 
an event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made." 
As further explained in Comment b to Section 264: 
Nature of regulation or order. Under the rule stated in this Section, the regulation 
or order may be domestic or foreign. It may emanate from any level of 
government and may be, for example, a municipal ordinance or an order of an 
administrative agency. Any governmental action is included and technical 
distinctions between "law," "regulation," "order" and the like are disregarded. It 
is not necessary that the regulation or order be valid, but a party who seeks to 
justify his non-performance under this Section must have observed the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing imposed by § 205 in attempting, where appropriate, to 
avoid its application. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 264, cmt. b. 
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provisions of the Restatement are Sections 264 and 266,
20 
rather than Sections 261 and 264 as in 
Landis. And as explained in Comment a to Section 266: 
Relation to other rules. A party's performance may be as easily 
affected by impracticability existing at the time the contract was 
made, because of some fact of which he was ignorant, as by 
supervening impracticability. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to 
characterize a situation as involving either existing or changed 
circumstances, as, for example, where a judicial decision is handed 
down after the time that the contract was made giving an 
unanticipated interpretation to a statute enacted before that time. 
Cf. Illustration 3. The rules stated in this Section for cases of 
existing impracticability and frustration therefore parallel those for 
supervening impracticability and frustration(§§ 261, 265). 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 266, cmt. a (underscoring added). 
Notwithstanding the fact that Burns presented all of the foregoing points and authorities 
to the trial court, it ruled that the doctrine of impossibility was inapplicable for substantially the 
same reasons that it ruled the doctrine of frustration was inapplicable: 
Section 10 of the Agreement indicates that the parties 
contemplated possible interference with construction from state 
laws and that Burns assumed the risk of any non-compliance.(
211 
20 
Section 266 of the Restatement provides as follows: 
(1) Where, at the time a contract is made, a party's performance under it 
is impracticable without his fault because of a fact of which he has no reason to 
know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract 
is made, no duty to render that performance arises, unless the language or 
circumstances indicate the contrary. 
(2) Where, at the time a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is 
substantially frustrated without his fault by a fact of which he has no reason to 
know and the non-existence of which is a basic assumption on which the contract 
is made, no duty of that party to render that performance arises, unless the 
language or circumstances indicate the contrary. 
21 
The trial court provides no guidance with respect to those words included within the 
generic language comprising "Section 1 O" that support this finding. Cf supra note 16. 
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There is no genuine issue of material fact that compliance with 
Idaho Code § 67-6516 was reasonably foreseeable by the 
• [221 B h . f b . . . . . parties. ecause t e necessity o o tammg a zonmg variance m 
order to exceed the maximum height allowance was reasonably 
foreseeable, [
231 
the doctrine of impossibility is inapplicable to the 
facts of this case. 
2nd MSJ Decision 14 [R, p. 181]. 
However, the trial court provides no factual support for its implicit finding that Bums 
could reasonably foresee when it executed the Agreement that Teton County would three months 
later deny Bums a CUP, that Teton County would then raise the variance requirement two years 
after Burns executed the Agreement, that the Supreme Court would then hold Burns was 
required to obtain a variance four years after Burns executed the Agreement, and that Teton 
County would then deny Bums a variance five years after Burns executed the Agreement 
because the Property is without problematic site characteristics. And if successive, interrelated 
events such as these are all held to be reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law, and without 
need of factual support or explanation for why or how they are foreseeable, when would Sections 
261, 264, and 266 of the Restatement ever have legal effect? 
Accordingly, because the trial court's holding is irreconcilable with the provisions in 
Sections 261, 264, and 266 of the Restatement and the Court of Appeal's holding in Landis, the 
doctrine of impossibility should be held to have suspended or discharged Bums' obligation to 
construct the Permanent Facility. 
22 
The trial court provides no explanation for why Bums might have reasonably foreseen 
the possible application of Idaho Code § 67-6516. 
23 
The trial court also provides no explanation for why Burns might have reasonably 
foreseen the necessity of obtaining a zoning variance, rather than the CUP. 
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D. Teton County Should Be Held To Be Estopped From Rezoning The Property By 
Application Of The Doctrine Of Quasi-EstoppeI.
24 
The elements of quasi-estoppel under Idaho law are as follows: 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending 
party took a different position than his or her original position, and 
(2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or caused a 
disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to 
change positions; or ( c) it would be unconscionable to permit the 
offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or 
she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. 
Terrazas v. Blaine Cnty. ex. rel. Bd. ofComm'rs, 147 Idaho 193, 200 n.3, 207 P.3d 169, 176 
(2009). 
There is no dispute that the Agreement was executed on behalf of Teton County by the 
Teton County Board of County Commissioners. See, e.g., Agreement 7 (which bears the seal of 
Teton County) [R, p. 19]. There is also no dispute that the Agreement requires: 
(iv) Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, 
Developer shall order and commence construction of the 
Permanent Facility. The installation of the Permanent Facility 
shall be completed within eighteen (18) months of execution of 
this Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting from 
weather, strikes, shortage of steel or manufacturing equipment or 
any other act of force ma1eure or action beyond Developer's 
control. 
(v) In order to facilitate and support the construction of the 
Permanent Facility and to allow the Developer to expedite 
commercial operations, the Developer shall erect and operate a 
temporary concrete batch plant on site as shown in Exhibit "B"-
Site Plan and Exhibit "D." 
Agreement ,r,r 2.b(iv)-(v) (underscoring added) [R, p. 14]. 
24 
Bums pleaded the doctrine of quasi-estoppel as an affirmative defense to Teton 
County's counterclaims. Reply ,r 29 [R, p. 147]. 
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Because the foregoing contractual provisions require Bums to immediately commence 
construction of the Permanent Facility and erect and operate the Temporary Facility, rather than 
delaying or conditioning Bums' performance until after Teton County approved the CUP 
application that was then pending before it, there can be no material question of fact but that the 
parties contemplated on August 31, 2007 that Teton County would promptly issue Burns the 
CUP and building permit required to construct the Permanent Facility. Nor can there be any 
material question of fact but that the parties then contemplated that the period for Burns to 
construct the Permanent Facility would be extended by any "act of force majeure or action 
beyond Developer's Control." Agreement ,r 2.b(iv). 
Thus, by entering into the Agreement Teton County "took the position" on August 31, 
2007 that Burns' should immediately commence construction of the Permanent Facility and erect 
and operate the Temporary Facility. Conversely, however, on November 15, 2007 Teton County 
"took the position" that Bums could not construct the Permanent Facility, Facts ,r 19; on 
November 5, 2012, Teton County "took the position" that the clause in Paragraph 2.b(iv) of the 
Agreement extending the 18-month period to construct the Permanent Facility was inapplicable 
and threatened to file suit to force Bums' removal of the Temporary Facility, Facts at ,r 29; and 
on June 11, 2013 Teton County filed a counterclaim in this lawsuit seeking to do just that. 
Moreover, with respect to the second element of quasi-estoppel and its three alternative 
grounds: 
• Teton County gained an advantage by obtaining the road and highway 
improvements Bums was required to construct under Paragraph 2.d(iv) of the 
Agreement and Teton County caused a disadvantage to Bums by requiring it to 
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expend hundreds of thousands of dollars in constructing such improvements, in 
erecting and operating the Temporary Facility, and in applying for and taking all 
actions necessary to obtain the zoning approvals required to construct the 
Permanent Facility. Facts ,r 18. 
• Not only was Burns "induced to change positions" by Teton County, but Burns 
was required to expend the hundreds of thousands of dollars just referenced by the 
express terms of the Agreement. Agreement ,r,r 2.b(iv)-(v) & 2.d(iv). 
• And, finally, it would be unconscionable to permit Teton County to now rezone 
the Property because Burns was required to expend the hundreds of thousands of 
dollars just referenced prior to the November 15, 2007 hearing of the Teton 
County Board of County Commissioners when they first unexpectedly "took the 
position" that Burns could not construct the Permanent Facility. Facts ,r 19. 
Accordingly, not only is the first element of quasi-estoppel satisfied in this dispute, but so is each 
and every one of the alternative grounds contained in the second element. 
The question of whether a county may be estopped from rezoning property after a 
property owner is induced by the county to change positions was discussed but not decided in 
Terrazas. See 147 Idaho at 201,207 P.3d at 177 ("although we do not reject the proposition that 
estoppel may be applied in appropriate circumstances, we do not find this to be an appropriate 
circumstance."). In articulating the considerations applicable to estopping a local government 
from rezoning property, the court in Terrazas quoted its earlier holding in Sprenger, Grubb & 
Associates, Inc. v. City of Hailey, 127 Idaho 576, 583, 903 P.2d 741, 748 (1995): 
In Harrell [v. The City of Lewiston, 95 Idaho 243, 
506 P.2d 470 (1973)], we held that "[i]n the 
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exercise of its police power, which includes the 
enactment and enforcement of zoning regulations, a 
municipality acts in a governmental capacity." We 
further stated that "[a]lthough a municipality may 
be estopped in limited circumstances, the enactment 
of zoning regulations is a governmental function 
which is not usually subject to estoppel." We 
determined in Harrell that no exigent reasons 
existed in that case for the application of estoppel 
without deciding what extraordinary circumstances 
may merit the application of the doctrine of estoppel 
in future cases. As in Harrell, we again determine 
that no exigent circumstances exist in this case to 
apply estoppel against the City in the exercise of its 
police power. 
As in Harrell and Sprenger, Grubb, we conclude that 
Applicants have failed to demonstrate the "exigent circumstances" 
that would warrant application of estoppel in the instant case. 
Considering first the underlying principles of estoppel, we note 
that it cannot be said that the Board took an inconsistent position 
by denying the application, as the determination that the proposed 
sites of disturbance fell within the MOD was the Board's one and 
only official position. Applicants have not asserted that actions of 
the Board induced them to change positions. 
Terrazas, 147 Idaho at 200-01, 207 P.3d at 176-77 (underscoring added) (internal citations 
omitted). 
In the present dispute, conversely, not only has Burns demonstrated "the 'exigent 
circumstances' that would warrant application of estoppel," but Teton County has clearly taken 
"an inconsistent position." Additionally, Burns has expressly asserted that actions of the Teton 
County Board of County Commissioners "induced [Burns] to change positions." Thus, every 
consideration articulated in Terrazas applicable to estopping Teton County from rezoning the 
Property against Burns' objection is satisfied in this dispute. 
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Although Burns made all of the foregoing arguments to the trial court, and it 
acknowledged the controlling legal principles to be applied, see 1st MSJ Decision 15-16 [R, pp. 
132-33], the trial court ruled that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel was inapplicable for the 
following reasons: 
Although Exhibit C does show a building elevation of 75 
feet, Section 10 of the Agreement states "Developer agrees to 
comply with all federal, state, county and local laws, rules and 
regulations, which appertain to the subject property." The 
inclusion of the building elevations, indicating a 75-foot height 
does not negate the requirements of Section 10 that Bums comply 
with the applicable zoning ordinance and/or obtain a variance. 
This Court cannot conclude, therefore, that the Agreement 
indicates Teton County took a position contrary to its ultimate 
d . 1 f' h . . [
251 
ema o t e zonmg variance. 
Bums' reliance on the Drigg's Planning and Zoning 
Commission's recommendation as proof Teton County has 
changed its position is also without merit. As in Terrazas, Bums 
cannot attribute the planning and zoning commission's 
recommendation to an official action by the Teton County Board 
fc C 
. . (26] 
o ounty omm1ss10ners. 
Furthermore, even if Teton County had taken a position 
different than its original position, Bums has not established any 
exigent circumstances that would warrant the application of quasi-
estoppel in this case. Bums argues that its expenditure of hundreds 
of thousands of dollars to construct improvements under the 
Agreement constitutes exigent circumstances sufficient to estop 
Teton County from denying it from constructing a 75-foot tall 
facility. However, as indicated in Terrazas, the expenditure of 
money, alone, is insufficient to create exigent circumstances 
25 
The trial court fails to address the requirements in paragraph 2.b(iv)-(v) of the 
Agreement requiring Bums to immediately commence construction of the Permanent Facility 
and to erect and operate the Temporary Facility. 
26 
The trial court misstates Bums' argument, which is that Teton County itself took 
official action when the Teton County Board of County Commissioners executed the Agreement. 
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sufficient to invoke the doctrine of quasi-estoppel m a zoning 
[27] 
case. 
1st MSJ Decision, 16-17 [R, pp. 133-34]. However, for the reasons set forth in the footnotes 
added by Bums to the trial court's foregoing ruling, the trial court both fails to address and 
misconstrues Bums' arguments establishing why the doctrine of quasi-estoppel should apply to 
this dispute. 
Accordingly, based on the points and authorities discussed above, and in light of the fact 
that the trial court's decision fails to consider the arguments made by Bums showing the 
satisfaction of both the first element of quasi-estoppel and each and every one of the alternative 
grounds comprising the second element, Teton County should be held to be estopped from 
rezoning the Property by application of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, Bums contends that there is no basis in the record or the 
law supporting the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Teton County based on its 
findings (a) that the Force Majeure Clause does not apply because "Bums should have foreseen 
that there was, at a minimum, a risk that its request for a CUP and/or zoning variance could or 
would be denied[,]" ]st MSJ Decision 12; (b) that the prevention doctrine does not apply because 
"Teton County's actions in denying the zoning variance were not unreasonable and was [sic] not 
outside the parties' contemplation as expressed in the Agreement[,]" id. at 14; (c) that the 
27 
The trial court again misstates Bums' argument, which is that Bums was induced by 
Teton County and the requirements in the Agreement to expend hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in constructing road and highway improvements/or the benefit a/Teton County, in erecting and 
operating the Temporary Facility, and in applying for and taking all actions necessary to obtain 
the zoning approvals necessary to construct the Permanent Facility. 
-42-
21813.00I\4852-1830-6093 v2 
impossibility doctrine does not apply "[b ]ecause the necessity of obtaining a zoning variance in 
order to exceed the maximum height allowance was reasonably forseeable," 2nd MSJ Decision 
14; and (d) that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel does not apply because Teton County did not take 
"a position contrary to its ultimate denial of the zoning ordinance[,]" and "Bums has not 
established any exigent circumstances that would warrant the application of quasi-estoppel in 
this case[,]" 1st 1\1SJ Decision 16-17. Thus, at a bare minimum, there would be genuine issues of 
material fact precluding the grant of summary judgment to Teton County if each of these 
questions were not decided in Bums' favor as a matter of law. Hayward v. Jack's Pharmacy 
Inc., 141 Idaho 622, 625, 115 P.3d 713, 716 (2005) (if the facts, with inferences favorable to the 
nonmoving party, are such that reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions, summary 
judgment is not available). 
Burns therefore respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial court's judgment in 
favor of Teton County, including the award of attorney fees, and to remand the case to the trial 
court for further proceedings consist with this Court's opinion. 
DATED this 29th day of February 2016. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER 
ByL-><'---'l{.:-"'-~-P'----J"c.c;_~~~~~~~~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of February 2016, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF to be served by the method indicated 
below and addressed to the following: 
Kathy Spitzer 
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney 
230 N. Main Street, Room 125 
Driggs, Idaho 83422-5124 
Facsimile (208) 354-2994 
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(x) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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Instrument# 191250 
TETON COUNTY, IDAHO 
2oo7-09-o5 04:57:00 No. of Pages: 12 
Recorded for: BURNS CONCRET 
MARY LOU HANSEN (Q Fe . 36 OO 
Ex-Officio Recorder Deputy9N k 
lnde:i: to. AGREEMENT 
DEVELOPER'S AGREEMENT for BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC 
:,-f 
On the ..3/--day of d\ ...,_ ~ , 2007, Teton County, Idaho (hereinafter 
referred to as "County"), and BtrnsHoldings, LLC, an Idaho limited liabil
ity company 
(hereinafter referred to as "Developer"), the owner of the real property desc
ribed in the 
attached E~hibit 11 A11 enter into the following agreement: 
WHEREAS, the Developer has applied for a zone change from C3, Servic
e and 
Highway Commercial to M 1, Light Industrial, for certain real property 
described in 
Exhibit nA11 , attached hereto and located in the City of Driggs Area of Im
pact, Teton 
County Idaho, and hereinafter referred to as "the property"; and 
WHEREAS, the Developer has requested the zone change for the purpo
se of 
developing a concrete batch plant facility on the property; and 
WHEREAS, the County, pursuant -to Section 67-6511A, Idaho Code, h
as the 
authority to conditionally rezone the property and to enter into a development a
greement for 
the purpose of allowing, by agreement, a specific development to proceed in a
 specific area 
and for a specific purpose or use which is appropriate in the area, but for whic
h all allowed 
uses for the requested zoning may not be appropriate pursuant to the Idaho 
Code and the 
City of Driggs Zoning Ordinance, adopted by the County as the official zoni
ng ordinance 
for the Driggs Area of Impact; and 
WHEREAS, the County and the Developer desire to formalize and clari
fy the 
respective obligations of the parties, it is agreed as fo11ows: 
1. Zoning Ordinance Amendment: The City of Driggs (hereinafter referre
d to as 
"City") has recommended approval of, and the County hereby grants, the zone
 change to M 
1, Light Industrial, for the property, and will adopt an ordinance amending the
 Driggs Area 
of Impact Zoning Map to rezone the property to M 1. 
2. Conditions on Development: The sole use allowed and restrictions purs
uant to 
this conditional rezone as reflected in this Agreement are as follows: 
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a. The property shall be used exclusively for the operation of a ready-
mix 
concrete manufacturing facility. 
b. At the current time the property has been re-zoned to M 1, L
ight 
Industrial as described in paragraph 1. above. Part of such approval and
 recommendation 
was based upon execution of this development agreement to identify re
sponsibilities and 
obligations pertaining to certain matters relating to the improvement and
 operation of the 
property. This development .and operation shall be subject to the fol1
owing terms and 
conditions, in addition to the other terms hereof: 
(i) Developer intends to operate a Ready-Mix Concrete 
Manufacturing Facility (a "Facility") on the property. 
(ii) All operations on the property shall comply with all applicable 
and governing local, state or U.S. ordinances and laws relating to dust, nois
e, water quality 
and air quality. 
(iii) Attached as Exhibit "B" - Site Plan, and Exhibit "C" -
Building Elevations, and by this reference incorporated herein are plans for con
struction of 
Developer's intended permanent facility ("Permanent Facility"). 
(iv) Immediately upon execution of this Agreement, Developer shaii 
order and commence construction of the Permanent Facility. The ins
tallation of the 
Permanent Facility shall be completed within eighteen (18) months of e
xecution of this 
Agreement by the County, subject to delays resulting from weather, stri
kes, shortage of 
steel or manufacturing equipment or any other act of force rnajeure 
or action beyond 
Developer's control. 
(v) In order to facilitate and support the construction of the 
Permanent Facility and to allow the Developer to expedite commerci
al operations, the 
Developer shall erect and operate a temporary concrete batch plant on
 site as shown in 
Exhibit "B" - Site Plan and Exhibit "D". 
(vi) In the event that the Permanent Facility is not completed within 
the time allowed herein, the County shall have the right to revoke the a
uthority to operate 
the Temporary Facility. The grant of authorit'J of the Temporary F
acility is to allow 
Developer to operate Developer's business until the Permanent Facility i
s constructed. The 
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authority to operate the Temporary Facility shall tem1ina1e upon com
pletion of the 
Permanent Facility even if sooner than the described eighteen (18) month
 time period. 
c. The access to the property from State Highway 33 shall be via Casp
er 
Lane, which shali be improved to City of Driggs Public Works 
Standards and 
Specifications, as shown in the construction drawings submitted by Develo
per and held by 
the City of Driggs, prior to operation of the Temporary Facility. 
d. To assure compatibility with other surrounding uses the followi
ng 
additional matters have been addressed and agreed upon for the Perma
nent Facility as 
follows: 
(i) Noise related issues will be addressed by construction of 
decorative concrete block walls of eight and three-quarters feet (8.75') in 
height along the 
boundaries of the property, as shown in Exhibit B - Site Plan and enclosure o
f the Batch 
P.lant Equipment within a building_, as shown in Exhibit C - Building Ele
vations. 
(ii) Dust wiH be controlled through paving of the area around the 
Facility, the enclosure of the Batch Plant Equipment within a building, 
a truck wash for 
trucks utilized by the Facility and a dust collection system on the Batch Pl
ant. In addition; 
the Facility will have an air quality permit from the Idaho Department o
f Environmental 
Quality and comply with the requirements of that agency. 
(iii) Hours of operation shall not be restricted as this is consistent 
with the provisions for M 1 and C3 zoning. The property is surrounded by p
roperty zoned 
M 1 and C3. The construction business activities of the Facility sometime
s require varying 
hours of operation due to the nature of the construction industry. 
(iv) Traffic issues shall be mitigated by construction of 
·' ----.}w;,, improvements on Casper Drive as described herein and the implementation of 
improvements on Highway 33 as required by the Idaho Department of T
ransportation. 
(v) Landscaping on the North and \Vest side will consist of a block 
wall with planter areas that will include trees or vegetation. The east 
boundary of the 
property shall have a fifteen ( 15) foot wide area reserved for future landsc
aping that will be 
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addressed if the furure road planned for the area is developed. See Ex11ibits "B" -Site Plan 
and "E"- B1ock Wall Planter Detail. 
(vi) Lighting issues shall be mitigated by using cm-off fixrures that 
direct the light downward rather than flood lighting. 
3. Indemnity: Developer agrees to, and does hereby, defend, hold harmless and 
indemnify the City and County, all associated elected and appointed officials, officers, 
employees, agents, representatives, and attorneys, from any and all claims that may, at any 
time, be asserted against any such parties in connection with: 
a. the City's or County's review and approval of any plans or 
improvements, or the issuance of any approvals, permits, certificates, or acceptances 
relating to the use and/or development of the property; 
b. the development, construction, and maintenance of the property; 
c. the performance by the County of its obligations under this Agreement 
and all related ordinances, resolutions, or other agreements; and 
d. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the indemnification terms of this 
paragraph 3 shall not extend or apply to the failure of the County to follow, in good faith, 
governing law or ordinances. 
4. Agreement Modification: This Agreement may be modified only by a written 
document, signed by the parties, or their successors in interest, after complying with the 
notice and hearing procedures of Idaho. Code §67-6509 and of the Driggs Zoning 
Ordinance. 
5. Zoning Reversion Consent: The execution of this Agreement shall be deemed 
written consent by Developer to change the zoning of the subject property to its prior 
designation upon failure to comply with the conditions imposed by this Agreement. No 
reversion shall take place until after a hearing on this matter pursuant to Idaho Code §67-
651 lA. Upon notice and hearing, as provided in this Agreement and in Idaho Code §67-
6509, if the property described in attached Exhibit "A" is not used as approved, or if the 
approved use ends or is abandoned, the Board of County Commissioners may, upon 
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receiving a recommendation from the City's governing board, order that the property will 
revert to the zoning designation (and land uses allowed by that zoning designation) existing 
immediately prior to the rezone action, i.e., the property shall revert back to the C3, 
Service and Highway Commercial zoning designation. 
6. Annual Review: The County may, while this Agreement is in effect, annually 
review the extent of good faith substantial compliance with the tem1s of this Agreement. 
Developer shall have the duty to demonstrate Developer's good faith compliance with the 
terms of this Agreement during such review. 
7. Performance: Developer shall comply with all commitments set out in this 
Agreement. Developer shall timely and satisfactorily carry out all required performance to 
appropriately maintain, in the discretion of the County, all commitments set forth in this 
Agreement. 
8. Default and Remedies: In the event of a default or breach of this Agreement 
or of any of its terms or conditions, the party alleging default shall give the breaching party 
not less than thirty (30) days Notice of Default, in writing, unless an emergency exists 
threatening the health and safety of the public. If such an emergency exists, written notice 
shall be given in a reasonable time and manner in light of the circumstances of the breach. 
The time of the giving of the notice shall be measured from the date of the written Notice of 
Default. The Notice of Default shall specify the nature of the alleged default and, where 
appropriate, the manner and period of time during which said default may be satisfactorily 
cured. During any period of curing, the party charged shall not be considered in default for 
the purposes of termination or zoning reversion, or the institution of legal proceedings. If 
the default is cured, then no default shall exist and the charging party shall take no further 
action. 
9. Termination: This Agreement may be terminated in accordance with the notice 
and hearing procedures of Idaho Code §67 ~6509, and the zoning designation upon which the 
use is based reversed, upon failure of Developer, a subsequent owner, or other person 
acquiring an interest in the property described in attached Exhibit "A" to comply with the 
terms of this Agreement. 
10. Compliance with Laws: Developer agrees to comply with all federal, state, 
county and local laws, rules and regulations, which appertain to the subject property. 
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Developer's failure to comply with the above laws or the terms of this Agreement wil1 
subject Developer to an enforcement action by the County in a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
11. Changes in Law: Any reference to laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, or 
resolutions shall include such laws, ordinances, rules, regulations, or resolutions as have 
been, to the date of this agreeinent, or as they may then be in force in the future with 
respect to proposed amendments to this Agreement in the future. 
12. Miscellaneous Provisions: 
a. The parties agree that the relationship created by the agreement is 
solely that of a private Developer and the City. Nothing in this agreement shall .create the 
Developer or City as an agent, employer, employee, legal representative, partner or 
subsidiary of the other. 
b. The parties agree that this Agreement shall run with the land and bind 
the property in perpetuity, and shall inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by the 
parties, and any of their respective legal representatives, heirs, successors, and assigns. 
c. All notice must be in writing, mailed in the U.S. Mail via certified mail 
to the addresses indicated on this agreement. 
d. This agreement shall be construed and enforced pursuant to the laws of 
the State. of Idaho. 
e. If any party shall bring suit against the other party to enforce this 
agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
f. If any term of this agreement is declared invalid, illegal or 
unenforceable, the remainder of this agreement shall remajn operative and binding. 
g. The Developer hereby guarantees the prompt and satisfactory 
correction of all defects or deficiencies in the improvements that occur or become evident 
" during the one-year period following [final construction of the improvements. If the defect 
or deficiency occurs or becomes evident, then the Developer shall commence correction of 
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the defect of deficiency within ten days after written notice from the City. The Developer 
shall proceed with reasonable diligence to correct the defect or deficiency. The guaranty 
shall be extended one full year from the date of repair or replacement of any improvement 
made pursuant to this paragraph. 
h. This agreement shall be signed in duplicate originals. Each party shall 
receive one original of this agreement. 
i. The County shall have this agreement recorded in the office of the 
Teton County Clerk. 
AGREED: 
Teton County, Idaho 
By: l_ ~ ") ~ -.. 
County Commissi~ ,a::::::_ 
P.O. Box 
Driggs, Idaho 83422 
Developer: 
BURNS HOLDINGS, LLC 
~ By>~
Kirk Bums, Manager 
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FROJ\tl INSTRUMENT NO. 183802 
TRACT l: FEE ESTATE 
EXHIBIT "A" 
LOT lB-\V, TETON PEAKS VIEW SUBDIVISION, TETON COUNTY, IDAHO, PART 
OF THE Wl/2.NEI/4, SECTION 23, TOWNSHIP 5 NORTH, RANGE 45 EAST, BOISE 
MERIDIAN, TETON COUNTY, IDAHO, BEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS: FROM 
THENl/4 CORNER OF SAID SECTION 23, SOUTH 975.63 FEET AND EAST, 627.41 
FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING; THENCE SOUTH 510.00 FEET TO A POINT; 
THENCE WEST 274.41 FEET TO A POINT; THENCE NORTH 510.00 FEET TO A 
POINT; THENCE EAST 274.41 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
TRACT 2: EASEMENT ESTATE 
TOGETHER \VITH A 60 FOOT WIDE ROAD AND UTILITY EASE1vfENT ALONG 
THE SOUTH SIDE OF THE. REMAINDER LOT lA, AS SHOWN ON THE RECORD 
OF SURVEY RECORDED FEBRUARY 24, 1999 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 133115, 
RECORDS OF TETON COUNTY, IDAHO. 
FROlvl INSTRUlvIBNT NO. 183803 
LOT lB-E, TETON PEAKS VIEW SUBDIVISION, TETON COUNTY, IDAHO, BEING 
FURTHER DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: PART OF THE Wl/2NE1/4 SECTION 23, 
TOWNSHIP 5 NORTH, RANGE 45 EAST, BOISE MERIDIAN, TETON COUNTY, 
IDAHO, BEING FURTHER DESCRIBED AS: FROM THE Nl/4 CORNER OF SAID 
SECTION 23, SOUTH 975.63 FEET AND EAST 627.41 FEET TO THE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. THENCE EAST 274.60 FEET TO A POINT; THENCE SOUTH 510.00 
FEET TO A POINT; THENCE WEST 274.60 FEET TO A POINT; THENCE NORTH 
510.00 FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
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Exhibit B 
Burns Holdings Driggs Site Plan Version 9.5 
··1 
I 
.· Te;iwarf~ ~ l 





= Paved Roadway 
i=:J = Paved Area 01 Facility 
!!~~3! = Lawn 
~ = Shrubery 
anm = Block Wall 
Aggregate Storage 
Ramp H',gh Bay { C.UP. ) 
• • a:uuc,u,rmm 
Temper Waler Stations 
ii 11 
' '-m.oco Ga. flttess"Wa'al PilwJI 
215' • 30'-0· 
West Boundary 
Version 9.1 
State Highway 33 




















EXHI BIT "c n 
EAST ELEVATION SOUTH ELEVATION 
















~~w:~.~,,;;t,,':d,.~;;,;1;,~~~~1J1~l~Jzg{~Jrt::,. VIEW AT WEST BOUNDARY VIEW AT WEST BOUNDARY. 
VIEW AT CASPER DRIVE ,TIEW AT NORTHWEST CORNER 
